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ABSTRACT 
STPA is a new hazard analysis technique that can identify more hazard causes than traditional techniques. It is based on the 
assumption that accidents result from unsafe control rather than component failures. To demonstrate and evaluate STPA for 
its application to rotorcraft, it was used to analyze the UH-60MU Warning, Caution, and Advisory (WCA) system associated 
with the electrical and fly-by-wire flight control system (FCS). STPA results were compared with an independently 
conducted hazard analysis of the UH-60MU using traditional safety processes described in SAE ARP 4761 and  
MIL-STD-882E. STPA found the same hazard causes as the traditional techniques and also identified things not found using 
traditional methods, including design flaws, human behavior, and component integration and interactions. The analysis 
includes organizational and physical components of systems and can be used to design safety into the system from the 
beginning of development while being compliant with MIL-STD-882.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 Systems Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) is a new 
hazard analysis technique that was created in response to 
inadequacies that exist in traditional, widely used hazard 
analysis techniques.  STPA differs from traditional safety 
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analysis techniques in treating safety as a control problem 
rather than a component failure problem, as discussed in 
Ref. 1. By expanding the focus from failures to control, 
STPA is able to identify and address not only component 
failures that can lead to a hazardous system state, but also 
design flaws and other unsafe causes that current  
failure-based methods cannot. 
STPA is an iterative, top-down modeling and hazard 
analysis technique based on system theory. The process 
starts the same as any hazard analysis technique, with 
identifying the accidents and high-level hazards to be 
considered. Then the system is modeled using hierarchical 
control loops, with each level controlling components at the 
level below. For example, in helicopters today, the pilot 
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controls the automatic control systems, which in turn control 
the aircraft physical components. Because the model can 
include the overlying organizational structure (and not just 
the physical system), an organizational analysis can be 
performed on various organizational factors impinging on 
safety, such as guidelines, regulations, training, etc.  
The analysis in this application is performed on the 
system model. Potential unsafe control actions are first 
identified that can lead to hazardous system states. Then the 
potential causal scenarios of the unsafe control actions are 
documented. The causal scenarios can be used to eliminate 
hazards from the system design and operations, to design 
mitigation and control measures for the causes that cannot be 
eliminated, and to create system and software safety 
requirements. Because the analysis is performed on a formal 
model, parts of it can be automated and assistance provided 
to the analyst, as shown in Ref. 2. 
In this paper, the use of STPA is demonstrated on the 
Warning, Caution, and Advisory (WCA) system of the  
UH-60MU aircraft. Because of resource limitations, STPA 
was performed only on parts of the WCA associated with the 
electrical and fly-by-wire flight control system (FCS). This 
part of the system is complex and critical enough, however, 
that the advantages of STPA can be adequately 
demonstrated. The organizational safety control structure 
(safety management system) for both training and routine 
peacetime operations of the UH-60MU and for combat 
operations was also modeled.  
STPA has been and is currently being used successfully 
to analyze systems in many fields, including aviation, 
spacecraft, automobiles, healthcare, nuclear power, and 
defense systems. One previous research study is of particular 
relevance to this paper. Reference 3 compares STPA and the 
ARP 4761 Safety Assessment Process widely used on 
aircraft. In particular, the wheel brake example in ARP 4761 
is analyzed using STPA and the types of results obtained are 
compared. When comparing the results of the two 
approaches, some important differences found were: 
 The ARP 4761 safety requirements are primarily 
quantitative, along with a few design assurance 
requirements and design requirements to support the 
independent failure assumptions of the quantitative 
failure analysis that is used to generate the 
requirements. In contrast, STPA generates functional 
design requirements to prevent hazards, including those 
that do not result from component or functional failures.  
 ARP 4761 provides guidance in implementing fail-safe 
design, with an emphasis on redundancy and monitors 
whereas STPA has the potential for suggesting more 
general safe design features, including eliminating 
hazards completely.  
 ARP 4761 places human operators outside the system 
boundaries, considering them primarily as mitigators of 
hazardous physical system failures. Human errors are 
not included. In contrast, STPA treats the human 
operator as a component of the system just like any 
other physical component and identifies hazard causes 
related to human behavior. 
 ARP 4761 omits software from the quantitative failure 
analysis and references the use of a general software 
engineering standard (DO-178B/C) to ensure that the 
software development uses more rigorous software 
engineering processes for more critical software. STPA, 
in contrast, treats software like any other system 
component in the hazard analysis and is able to generate 
the functional safety requirements for the software.  
The authors of Ref. 3 conclude that due to the increasing 
complexity and use of software in aircraft, the traditional 
hazard analysis methods described in ARP 4761 are no 
longer as effective on software-intensive systems where 
accidents may result from unsafe interactions among the 
components and not just component failures.  
The UH-60MU WCA System 
According to Ref. 4, the Blackhawk helicopter 
“performs a wide range of missions that encompass Air 
Assault, MEDEVAC, Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR), 
Command and Control, and VIP transport” (pp. 3). Sikorsky 
states that “the newest version of the Army’s premier 
combat utility helicopter will ensure compatibility with the 
U.S. Army’s Future Force and will bring new life to the 
existing fleet of helicopters, improve their effectiveness, 
reduce their vulnerability, and allow for future growth of the 
fleet while lowering operating and support costs” (pp. 3). 
The UH-60MU platform contains a Common Avionics 
Architecture System (CAAS) that gives the helicopter an 
entirely new cockpit and changes how the helicopter handles 
WCAs beyond that of the glass cockpit integration in the 
baseline UH-60M.  
The WCA system has three functionally separate 
components. The first component is a master warning panel 
that communicates directly with aircraft subsystems and 
initiates a warning display to the Flight Crew if an issue 
arises, providing early notification of cautions and warnings. 
The second WCA component links different aircraft 
subsystems to various CAAS components that then process 
the data and display relevant information to the Flight Crew 
via the Multi-Function Displays (MFDs). These components 
determine if a warning, caution, or advisory needs to be 
displayed, how the warning, caution, or advisory will be 
displayed, and the priority that should be given to each 
occurrence based upon a set of criteria and priorities 
established as part of the design. The third component of the 
system is the audible tone and voice warnings transmitted to 
the Flight Crew through the intercommunication system 
(ICS) after being triggered by one of the subsystem 
components.  The Master Caution System, CAAS integrated 
WCA system voice warnings, and aural warnings were 
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designed to provide up to date information about the state of 
the helicopter and its associated systems to the Flight Crew 
when responding to failures or exceedances outside of 
normal ranges. 
UH-60MU STPA CASE STUDY 
The focus of this analysis is on the warnings, cautions, 
and advisories that are associated with two specific 
subsystems: the electrical subsystem and the FCS. The 
following sections document the STPA process in applying 
this hazard analysis technique.  
Defining Accidents and Hazards 
Before any hazard analysis, the accidents (losses) to be 
prevented and the hazardous states that can directly lead to 
those losses must be identified. In Ref. 1, an accident is 
defined as an undesired and unplanned event that results in a 
loss, including a loss of human life or human injury, 
property damage, environmental pollution, mission loss, 
financial loss, etc. For the purpose of this effort, two relevant 
accidents were used: A-1: Loss or major damage to aircraft 
and A-2: One or more fatalities or significant injuries. 
The definition of a hazard in MIL-STD-882 is vague 
and can include just about anything. To be more specific, 
Ref. 1 defines a hazard as a system state or set of conditions 
that together with a worst-case set of environmental 
conditions will lead to an accident (loss). Table 1 shows the 
hazards used in this analysis that can lead to the two selected 
accidents. Table 1 also illustrates the high-level safety 
constraints associated with these top level hazards.   
Table 1. Hazards and derived high-level  
safety constraints 
Hazard Definition 
Safety 
Constraint 
H1: Violation 
of minimum 
separation 
requirements. 
 
Can lead to: 
(A-1, A-2) 
Minimum separation 
is defined as the 
helicopter coming into 
close proximity with 
another source of mass 
(such as the terrain, 
another aircraft, etc.) 
The aircraft 
must maintain 
adequate 
separation from 
potential 
sources of 
collision. 
H2: Lack of 
aircraft control.  
 
Can lead to: 
(A-1, A-2) 
Lack of control is 
defined as inability of 
the Flight Crew to 
control the aircraft  
The aircraft 
must be under 
control of the 
Flight Crew at 
all times. 
These accidents and hazards were selected based on the 
definitions of an accident and hazard contained within STPA 
guidelines. While the STPA accident definitions are similar 
to critical and catastrophic hazard definitions used in 
independently conducted traditional hazard analyses of the 
UH-60MU, the STPA hazard definitions do not correlate 
with the traditional hazard analysis approach. The difference 
in hazard definitions is important because they are not 
simply failures and thus allow for the identification of a 
wide range of unsafe control actions and causal scenarios in 
the analysis.  
Creating the hierarchical control structure 
After the system-level hazards have been identified, a 
hierarchical control structure for the system is created. This 
control structure can include the organizational structure 
(which we demonstrate in the next section) and the physical 
system functional control structure. A control structure is 
composed of hierarchically organized feedback control 
loops. For example, the pilot controls the automated control 
systems, which in turn control the physical components of 
the aircraft. 
 
Figure 1.The Form of a Simple Hierarchical  
Control Structure (Ref. 1, pp. 269) 
Figure 1 shows a simple control structure with a human 
controller at the top. Note that both human and automated 
controllers use a model of the controlled process in order to 
determine what control actions to provide. This process 
model is used by the control algorithm within the controller 
to determine what control actions are required. Human 
controllers must, in addition, have a model of the automation 
that informs control action generation, along with various 
written procedures, training, and environmental inputs. This 
model is often called a mental model and is important in 
situation awareness. The process (mental) models are 
updated using feedback from the controlled process. 
Depending on the system design, the human controller may 
or may not have the ability to directly control the controlled 
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process or to directly receive feedback about it. Otherwise, 
the control actions and feedback must go through the 
automated controller. Process models are used in the 
identification of unsafe control actions in STPA and allow 
humans to be included in the hazard analysis. 
Organizational Control Structure 
An organizational safety control structure for the 
training and routine peacetime operations of the UH-60MU 
system is shown in Figure 2. The overall system goal for this 
organizational control structure, as applicable for this effort, 
is to provide traceable guidance, regulations, and orders for 
army systems operations. The controls at the organizational 
level affect the control of the UH-60MU at the aircraft level.  
Part of constructing the safety control structure is to 
document the safety-related responsibilities of each 
component within the organization. While each component 
contained in Figure 2 will not be discussed in detail as part 
of this paper, consider the following example. Depicted at 
the top right of Figure 2, Ref. 5 states that the Director of
 Army Safety (DASAF) manages the Army aviation accident 
prevention program and is responsible for “Army-wide 
aviation safety functions cited in AR 10-88 [and for] 
providing the functions of developing aviation risk control 
options for commanders” (pp. 1). The responsibilities and 
safety-related decisions made by the DASAF thus influence 
decisions and organizational control at various levels, 
including at the UH-60MU level.  
The UH-60MU can also be used during combat 
operations and influenced by combat-specific guidance and 
regulations. Therefore, a separate combat operational safety 
control structure is needed for analysis and is shown in 
Figure 3. Because one of the goals of this project was to 
compare STPA with traditional hazard analysis methods, 
which do not include organizational factors in safety, only 
the aircraft level of the system model was analyzed. 
However, STPA can be used on any hierarchical control 
structure and therefore the organizational components 
impacting safety and hazards, such as command decision 
making, training regulations, guidelines, procedures, etc., 
can be included. 
Figure 2. UH-60MU training and peacetime operational safety control structure 
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Figure 3. UH-60MU combat operational safety control structure 
 
UH-60MU Functional Control Structure 
The UH-60MU is shown only as a single block in 
Figures 2 and 3. One of the important aspects of modeling 
and analyzing complex systems is the ability to work at 
various levels of abstraction. In the remainder of the paper, 
the control structure within the aircraft itself is analyzed in 
more detail.  
Figure 4 shows the aircraft-level UH-60MU control 
structure containing the main functional components of the 
aircraft. Because the analysis starts with a model of the 
entire system, a top-down system hazard analysis can be 
performed using STPA to identify how interactions among 
system components can lead to accidents. Not only can 
system interactions be considered, but much of the analysis 
of the detailed system can be eliminated by only considering 
those features that have a safety impact on the system as a 
whole. This is, of course, the great advantage of a top-down 
analysis method, such as STPA, versus a bottom-up one 
such as Failure Mode, Effects, and Criticality Analysis 
(FMECA). 
As shown in Figure 4,  the Flight Crew, which is 
composed of the Pilot-in-Command (PC), Pilot (PI), and 
Crew Chief (CE), is responsible for maneuvering the 
helicopter, providing system inputs through the pilot vehicle 
interface (PVI), providing the control system parameters for 
the helicopter’s automatic control systems, managing 
internal communications, and managing external 
communications during operations. In order to perform these 
tasks, each of the members that make up the Flight Crew has 
various process (mental) models that inform them of the 
current state of the controlled process, including. a model of 
the state of the overall helicopter, a model of the state of the 
mission environment, a model of the state of the PVI 
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systems, and a model of the state of the automatic control 
systems. These models together inform the Flight 
Crewmembers’ decisions and action generation. As stated 
earlier, a common cause of accidents involving humans and 
computers is that these models of the controlled processes 
become inconsistent with the state of the real system and 
unsafe control is provided. For example, the Flight Crew 
may be unaware that icing conditions exist or that the 
existing controls designed into the UH-60MU to mitigate 
icing conditions are not functioning properly. As a result of 
this flawed process model, the Flight Crew may therefore 
not take appropriate actions needed for safe helicopter 
operation. 
The subsystems that comprise the PVI are responsible 
for providing an interface for Flight Crew control of 
automatic control systems, providing an interface for Flight
Crew control of other aircraft subsystems; providing relevant 
feedback to the Flight Crew regarding the helicopter’s 
status; and integrating sensor feedback to initiate warnings, 
cautions, and advisories through the various WCA systems.  
As is true for all controllers, the PVI components each have 
a process model of the mission equipment, the automatic 
control systems, and the physical components of the 
helicopter. These models inform their action generation. The 
helicopter subsystems that comprise the automatic control 
systems each have a process model of the mission 
equipment, the overall functioning of the helicopter, and the 
Flight Crew that is operating the helicopter. The automatic 
control systems use these process models to automatically 
regulate aircraft system functions, integrate Flight Crew 
control inputs to generate output commands, provide control 
mixing functions, and provide autopilot and flight director 
mode functions. 
Figure 4. High-level control structure at the UH-60MU level 
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Figure 5 provides a more detailed model regarding the 
control actions between components and the feedback 
provided by the component.  To reduce the scope of the 
analysis to fit the resources of this demonstration project 
(there are over 200 warnings, cautions, and advisories 
associated with all of the helicopters’ functions), the analysis 
focuses on the control actions and feedback associated with 
two of the helicopters subsystems and applicable WCAs: the 
electrical system and FCS. The content of the control actions 
and feedback contained within each of the arrows depicted 
in Figure 5 are omitted to make the figure readable. 
However, a few examples will be given to highlight the 
information contained within each control and feedback 
arrow.  
For instance, consider the control actions that the Flight 
Crew provides through each respective Pilot Vehicle 
Interface. Related to the electrical subsystem, the Pilot-in-
Command (PC) and Pilot (PI) are responsible for controlling 
the main generator power, APU generator power, battery 
power, external power, and arming the standby instruments. 
Related to the FCS, the PC and PI are responsible for 
providing collective and cyclic control input along with 
pedal deflections to maneuver the helicopter. They are also 
responsible for inputting FCS trim changes, stabilator 
deselections, Direct Mode selections, and activating auto 
stabilator control.  
The Flight Crewmembers also receive feedback from 
their respective PVI components as well as directly from the 
aircraft subsystems. For example, both the PC and PI receive 
tactile feedback from switches and active inceptors, auditory 
sensory feedback from audio warnings and tones, visual 
feedback from the multifunctional display and other cockpit 
displays, as well as visual feedback from the master warning 
panel and applicable WCA lights, to name a few. This 
feedback, along with all of the other feedback being 
presented is used by the Flight Crew to update their various 
mental process models that they have of the respective 
controlled processes. Furthermore, mission related 
communication occurs between the PC, PI, and CEs and 
allows for additional information to be passed between these 
controllers during operations. While these examples discuss 
control actions and feedback contained in the arrows 
between the Flight Crew and PVI, each control and feedback 
arrow contains similar information that is relevant for the 
identification of unsafe control actions in the analysis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Functional control structure of the UH-60MU 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 8 
Figure 6 expands upon the control structure of the 
electrical system and models the different electrical related 
systems in the PVI, automatic control, and aircraft 
subsystem components.  
Looking at Figure 6, the Flight Crew provides control 
inputs to the electrical system through the helicopter’s 
overhead console and eight circuit breaker panels. While the 
Flight Crew receives visual and tactile feedback from these 
sources, the main source of feedback related to the electrical 
system is through the pilot and co-pilot MFDs. There are 
four distinct components within the electrical automatic 
control subsystem: the auxiliary power unit (APU) generator 
control units (GCU), the AC generator GCUs, the external 
power monitor and the permanent magnetic generators 
(PMG) regulators.  
The APU GCU regulates the helicopters’ APU 
generator. The #1 and #2 GCU regulate the helicopters’ #1 
and #2 AC generators respectively. An external power 
monitor regulates power that is being provided to the 
helicopter from an external power source. The #1 and #2
 PMG regulators provide control authority over the #1 and 
#2 PMG. The helicopter has multiple redundant sources that 
provide AC and DC power to the helicopter, as depicted in 
the aircraft subsystem section of Figure 6. The two AC 
generators provide AC as the primary source of power. The 
AC generators feed two independent AC primary buses and 
also provide a portion of their load to be converted to DC, 
which is distributed by two independent DC primary buses 
and two independent DC essential buses. In emergency 
situations that require power from a source other than the 
two AC generators, the APU generator is capable of 
providing flight-critical power to the AC and DC buses. The 
UH-60MU’s electrical system has a hierarchical rank 
structure of its electrical power supplies, which allow for the 
main #1 and #2 AC generators to take precedence over the 
APU generator, which automatically takes precedence over 
external power supplies. The permanent magnetic generators 
(PMGs) provide flight critical DC power for the FCS while 
the two 24-volt batteries provide backup DC power to both 
the DC Converters for mission equipment and the flight 
critical systems. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Detailed control structure applicable to electrical subsystems 
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Figure 7 shows more detail about the FCS and the 
different FCS related systems that are in the PVI, automatic 
control, and aircraft subsystem components. The Flight 
Crew provides hardware and software-based PVI flight 
control inputs and receives hardware and software-based 
PVI feedback through the helicopter’s active cyclic, active 
collective, pedals, one engine inoperative (OEI) training 
panel, engine control panel, and master warning panels.  The 
software based PVI consists of two pilot MFDs, two co-pilot 
MFDs, an ICS, two flight director display control panels 
(FDDCP), a FCS control panel, and two central display units 
(CDU) that receive Flight Crew input, process commands, 
and provide software-based PVI feedback to the Flight 
Crew. 
The automatic control subsystem consists of dual 
redundant full authority digital engine control systems
 (FADEC), dual redundant inceptor control units (ICUs) and 
triple redundant flight control computers (FCCs). The FCCs 
receive all commands generated by the Flight Crew and PVI 
and process these commands to be implemented by the 
appropriate aircraft subsystem. The FCCs also receive 
feedback from all relevant subsystems, process the raw data, 
and send feedback through the respective hardware-based or 
software-based PVI to the Flight Crew.  
The FCS includes redundant embedded global 
positioning/inertial navigation systems (EGIs), redundant 
rotor rpm (NR) sensors, triple redundant inertial navigation 
units (INUs), redundant air data computers (ADCs), an 
integrated vehicle health management system (IVHMS), a 
radar altimeter, weight on wheel switches, and various 
servos, actuators, and pumps that are used to implement 
control of the rotors.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Detailed control structure applicable to FCS subsystems 
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Unsafe Control Actions 
Using the modeled control structure, STPA identifies 
potential unsafe control actions leading to the identified 
hazards and scenarios that can lead to these unsafe control 
actions. An example of an unsafe control action is that 
“Flight Crew arms standby instruments after main batteries 
have already been discharged thus depleting the standby 
batteries before landing [H-2].” Note that the unsafe control 
action is just what is usually labeled a hazard or a hazard 
cause.  
An unsafe control action can be divided into four parts: 
a source controller, the type of control action, the control 
action itself, the context in which the control action occurs. 
Each unsafe control action is also labeled with the system 
hazard to which it contributes in order to provide 
traceability. In this case: inability to safely control the 
aircraft (H-2). Note that complete traceability of hazards to 
the system design can be provided by this process. 
The initial part of the unsafe control action is the source 
controller within the functional control structure that either 
provides (or does not provide) the control action that is 
being analyzed.  In this analysis, the source controllers are 
the Flight Crew, various PVI components, or various 
automatic controllers. For the example above, the source 
controller is the Flight Crew. 
The second part of an unsafe control action is type of 
unsafe control. There are four types of unsafe control: (1) 
not providing a control action leads to a hazard, (2) 
providing a control action leads to the hazard, (3) a control 
action provided with incorrect timing or in the wrong order 
creates the hazard, or (4) a control action stopped too soon 
or applied for too long (for a continuous control action) 
results in a hazard. Each relevant control action falls into one 
of these four categories. In the example above, the type is 
the first one, i.e., providing a control action that leads to a 
hazard.  
The third part is the control action itself. In the example 
the control action is arming the standby instruments. The 
fourth and final part of the unsafe control action is the 
context or scenario that defines what actually makes the 
control action unsafe. In our example, the context is after the 
main batteries have already been discharged. The result of 
the unsafe control action is depleting the standby batteries 
before landing. There is always a context in which the 
control action is unsafe. If the control action is always 
unsafe, then it would not have been included in the system 
design. 
It is important to note that these unsafe control actions 
do not need to be solely in response to failures.  Design 
issues during normal operation of the equipment can and 
often do cause unsafe control actions when the crew or 
system does not respond to control the system in response to 
input or stimulus that is part of the design as intended.  This 
important distinction allows identification of flaws in the 
design for both normal operations and in response to 
failures. To identify unsafe control actions for the electrical 
system focus, the control loops between the Flight Crew, 
PVI, automatic control and the aircraft subsystems were 
analyzed. To identify unsafe control actions for the FCS 
focus, the control loops between the Flight Crew, the 
hardware and software-based PVI, automatic control, and 
the aircraft subsystems were analyzed. 
Using this process 126 unsafe control actions associated 
with the electrical subsystem and FCS were identified. There 
were 24 unsafe control actions identified between the Flight 
Crew and the PVI (electrical), 10 unsafe control actions 
identified between the automatic control and the aircraft 
subsystems (electrical), 44 unsafe control actions identified 
between the Flight Crew and the PVI (FCS), 24 unsafe 
control actions identified between the software-based PVI 
and the automatic control (FCS), and 24 unsafe control 
actions identified between the automatic control and the 
aircraft subsystems (FCS).  Table 2 shows one row from an 
unsafe control action table that identifies unsafe control 
actions related to the electrical subsystems. It has been found 
that documenting these control actions in tables is 
convenient for the analyst. Automated tools can generate all 
the possible unsafe control actions from the control 
structure, but human intervention is needed to sort through 
the generated list to identify which ones are possible and 
hazardous. By automating the generation of all unsafe 
control actions, this step in the process can be shown to be 
complete. 
 
Table 2. Partial UCA table depicting three electrical related unsafe control actions 
Control 
Action 
Not providing causes 
hazard 
Providing causes hazard Incorrect timing/ 
incorrect order 
Stopped too soon/ 
applied too long 
Electrical 
Cautions 
ON 
ES UCA32: 
EICAS does not display 
an “electrical” caution 
when the applicable 
conditions for an alert 
exist. [H-1, H-2] 
ES UCA33: 
EICAS presents an 
“electrical” caution when 
the conditions applicable to 
the caution do not exist. 
[H-1, H-2] 
ES UCA34: 
EICAS presents an 
“electrical” caution too late 
for the Flight Crew to 
recover the aircraft to a 
safe condition. [H-1, H-2] 
 
 
N/A 
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Identifying Causes of Unsafe Control Actions 
In many cases, identifying the unsafe control actions 
allows design requirements to be generated and provides 
enough information for engineers to eliminate or mitigate 
the unsafe control in the system design. If more information 
is needed or desired to adequately eliminate or mitigate the 
unsafe control, then more information about its causes, i.e., 
the scenarios leading up to it, must be obtained. This 
scenario generation step cannot be automated (at least not 
yet) and requires human analysis. The same is true for the 
traditional hazard analysis methods, of course. Because 
STPA works on a formal model, automation of this step is 
potentially possible in the future. 
Figure 8 shows some generic control loop flaws that can 
lead to an unsafe control action. For example, a controller 
might not provide a control action when needed or might 
provide an unsafe one because of an inadequate control 
algorithm or an inconsistent, incomplete, or incorrect 
process model of the controlled process or system state. This 
flawed process model could, in turn, result from inadequate, 
incorrect, missing, or delayed feedback from sensors. 
Sensors may not operate as required due to feedback delays, 
measurements inaccuracies, or missing sensor information 
from the controlled process. There is also the possibility that 
a correct control action causes safety problems due to 
delayed operation from an actuator or component failures, 
resulting in an unsafe system state.  
Another reason for an accident is that a safe control 
action is provided, but it is not executed correctly. The 
hazard causes found by component failure-based hazard 
analysis techniques are this type of cause, i.e., a failure in the 
execution of a control command. STPA, however, also 
allows the analyst to identify causes that do not result from 
failure but from requirements and design errors, i.e., the 
component behavior satisfies its requirements but those 
requirements are incorrect, perhaps because the designer 
forgot cases or misunderstood how the system components 
would interact and work together or did not account for 
human errors. 
Causal scenarios were generated for each of the 126 
identified unsafe control actions for the electrical systems 
and FCS WCA systems in the UH-60MU aircraft. It is not 
possible to discuss each individually within the scope of this 
paper, however, example electrical and FCS causal scenarios 
are described in the following sections.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Generic control loop flaws (Ref. 1, p. 93) 
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Example Electrical System Hazard Causal Scenarios 
Consider the following unsafe control action and causal 
scenarios related to the electrical subsystem: Flight Crew 
switches battery power ON and does not reduce the amount 
of mission equipment (when batteries are the only source of 
DC power) to allow sufficient time for a safe landing in 
friendly territory. [H-1, H-2] There are at least three causal 
scenarios identified that could lead to this unsafe control 
action: 
 Scenario 1: The Flight Crew does not reduce the 
amount of mission equipment when batteries are the 
only source of DC power because the Flight Crew is 
unable to immediately determine what mission 
equipment can safely be taken offline. 
 Scenario 2: The Flight Crew is unaware that the 
batteries are the only source of DC power that is 
powering the helicopter. This flawed process (mental) 
model could be the result of: 
a) The Flight Crew does not receive the applicable 
cautions because of a WCA system failure and thus 
does not know that there has been total power loss 
except for the battery power supply.  
b) Applicable cautions associated with power loss are 
annunciated to the Flight Crew but they are masked by 
other warnings, cautions, and advisories that are also 
being presented to the Flight Crew. 
 Scenario 3: The Flight Crew does not know that there is 
insufficient time to safely land the helicopter given the 
power remaining and the amount of power being used 
by the mission equipment unless the amount of mission 
equipment is reduced. This flawed process model could 
result because: 
a) The amount of battery power remaining is not 
presented to the Flight Crew. 
b) The amount of power time that is remaining given 
battery power remaining and mission equipment on is 
not presented to the Flight Crew.  
c) The Flight Crew is unaware of a battery low charge 
condition due to a failure of the battery low charge 
caution display. 
Scenario 1 represents a situation where the Flight Crew 
does not provide a control action needed for safe helicopter 
operations because doing so could result in another potential 
conflicting safety concern. Scenario 2 and Scenario 3 
represent situations where the Flight Crew does not provide 
a needed control action because of a process model flaw that 
could result from a component failure, inadequate 
interpretation of correct and available feedback, and/or 
missing or inadequate feedback.  
With these three causal scenarios generated, it is 
possible to then mitigate these safety concerns through 
recommended safety requirements. For instance, four 
possible safety requirements for Scenario 1 could include: 
1. Implement an automated power saving mode that shuts 
off equipment that is not being used in order to prolong 
battery life in emergency situations. 
2. When battery power is the sole source of power for the 
helicopter, the Flight Crew must still have access to 
critical information to make a safe landing under 
mission conditions.  
3. The UH-60MU operator manual should rank order 
mission equipment in terms of DC power consumption 
to allow the Flight Crew to determine what mission 
equipment should be powered off first in the event that 
mission equipment must be reduced to allow sufficient 
time for a safe landing.  
4. The Flight Crew should receive adequate training and 
guidance in landing the helicopter when landing under 
minimum electrical power conditions.  
 
Two possible safety requirements for Scenario 2 may 
include:  
1. The Flight Crew must receive feedback any time battery 
power is the sole source of DC power being supplied to 
the helicopter. 
2. Further analysis of warning, cautions, and advisories 
must be conducted to ensure that the hierarchy of 
displaying WCAs to the Flight Crew does not result in 
important information being masked in critical 
emergency situations.  
 
Two possible safety requirements for Scenario 3 may 
include:  
1. The Flight Crew should receive feedback regarding how 
much battery power remains and the percentage of 
battery charge that remains while batteries are being 
used as the sole means of electrical power for the 
helicopter.  
2. The Flight Crew should receive feedback regarding how 
long the batteries will provide power to the helicopter 
before being depleted given the amount of equipment 
that is receiving power. 
 
These three causal scenarios and the associated potential 
recommended requirements highlight an important point. 
The possibility of an emergency landing due to loss of main 
sources of power and mission equipment running solely on 
battery power was identified in the UH-60MU, as well as 
older versions of the Blackhawk. There are emergency 
procedures in the manuals that direct the Flight Crew to land 
the aircraft as soon as possible and disconnect unnecessary 
electrical equipment. The manuals, however do not address 
what equipment should be turned off or their relative power 
consumption to provide the crew with a realistic process for 
increasing the time that critical equipment might remain 
available. STPA allows for not only the identification of 
unsafe control actions and the causal scenarios that can lead 
to a hazardous system state, but it also allows for a 
meaningful consideration of the role of the Flight Crew 
(human factors) in emergency scenarios. By considering the 
Flight Crew as an integral component of the system and by 
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recommending safety requirements and constraints that 
allow for the Flight Crew to receive appropriate information 
and feedback necessary for safe helicopter operation, unsafe 
scenarios such as the three previously described can be 
adequately mitigated through design or by providing more 
detailed information in flight manuals and training. 
Example FCS Causal Scenarios 
Consider the following unsafe control action and 
associated causal scenarios related to the FCS: One or more 
of the FCCs command collective input to the hydraulic 
servos too long, resulting in an undesirable rotor RPM 
condition. [H-1, H-2] There are at least five causal scenarios 
identified that could lead to this unsafe control action: 
 Scenario 1: The FCCs are unaware that the desired state 
has been achieved and continue to supply collective 
input. The FCCs could have this flawed process model 
because:  
a) The FCCs are not receiving accurate position 
feedback from the main rotor servos.  
b) The FCCs are not receiving input from the ICUs to 
stop supplying swashplate input. 
 Scenario 2: The FCCs do not send the appropriate 
response to the aircraft for particular control inputs. 
This could happen if: 
a) The control logic does not follow intuitive guidelines 
that have been implemented in earlier aircraft, perhaps 
because requirements to do so were not included in the 
software requirements specification.  
b) The hardware on which the FCCs are implemented 
has failed or is operating in a degraded state. 
 Scenario 3: The FCCs do not provide feedback to the 
pilots to stop commanding collective increase when 
needed because the FADEC is supplying incorrect cues 
to the FCCs regarding engine conditions. 
 Scenario 4: The FCCs do not provide feedback to the 
pilots to stop commanding collective increase when 
needed because the FCCs are receiving inaccurate NR 
sensor information from the main rotor. 
 Scenario 5: The FCCs provide incorrect tactile cueing 
to the ICUs to properly place the collective to prevent 
low rotor RPM conditions. 
Each of these scenarios could be expanded if necessary 
to design appropriate mitigation. For example, in Scenario 4, 
the reasons that the FCCs could receive inaccurate NR 
sensor information from the main rotor could be identified. 
Scenario 1 represents a situation where the FCCs continue to 
provide a control action for too long due to a flawed process 
model. Scenario 2 represents a component failure or 
software requirements error that could result in an unsafe 
control action. Scenarios 3 through 5 represent situations 
where missing or incorrect feedback results in a hazardous 
system state. Given only the information in the scenario, 
mitigation measures could be identified. For example, three 
safety requirements could be identified related to Scenario 1: 
1. The FCCs must perform median testing to determine if 
feedback received from the main rotor servos is 
inaccurate.  
2. The PR SVO FAULT caution must be presented to the 
Flight Crew if the FCCs lose communication with a 
main rotor servo.  
3. The EICAS must alert the Flight Crew if the FCCs do 
not get input from the ICU every x seconds. 
If these are mitigation measures are considered to be 
inadequate, e.g., median testing is not a good enough 
indicator or simply alerting the crew is not safe enough, then 
further scenario development could determine the hardware 
failures that could lead to these requirements and determine 
if there are ways to control or mitigate them. 
Comparison of the STPA UH-60MU results to the 
Traditional Safety Analysis Results 
The five causal scenarios related to the example FCS 
unsafe control action do not have a direct correlation to any 
single hazard identified in the previous hazard analyses for 
the UH-60MU performed using traditional hazard analysis 
techniques. While there are indirect correlations with failure 
conditions that were identified previously in the aircraft 
level FHA, STPA causal scenarios go further in the 
identification of the causes and mitigation of this unsafe 
control action.  
Reference 6 (the UH-60MU FHA) discusses failure 
scenarios that allow for an indirect comparison. One failure 
condition is “loss of auxiliary flight state information 
[steering cues]” (p. 33). Reference 6 states that such a failure 
condition would result in the Flight Crew having an 
increased workload and that the Flight Crew would need to 
control the aircraft based on visual cues. The hazard severity 
is classified as critical because the loss of auxiliary flight 
state information could impact the Flight Crew’s ability to 
properly control the aircraft. One of the causal factors for 
this hazardous condition is that the Flight Crew does not 
detect the loss of auxiliary flight state information.  As such, 
traditional hazard analysis techniques place a huge emphasis 
on the Flight Crew responding correctly when hardware 
systems fail or the software does the wrong thing. The only 
alternative is to eliminate all failures. Unfortunately, 
counting on perfect human behavior is unrealistic and leads 
to most accidents being blamed on the human operators. 
STPA instead focuses on the interactions through control 
and feedback, including the Flight Crew responding to 
feedback from the system and having the ability to process 
the feedback and apply the appropriate control/response. 
These interactions are critical to identifying design flaws 
where the Flight Crew and systems interaction can lead to 
process model flaws that contribute to unsafe control actions 
which then create hazardous conditions for the aircraft and 
crew. In essence, STPA provides more detailed causal 
analysis that can be used to provide design features that do 
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not rely on the crew behaving perfectly in every emergency 
situation or provide them with help to do that job. 
STPA considers a wide range of contributing factors, 
assessing what can lead to unsafe control actions and 
hazardous system states. Identifying these contributing 
factors allows the analyst to recommend much larger 
number of safety mitigation techniques to constrain the 
system behavior and mitigate or prevent hazardous system 
states. More important, STPA can be performed during 
concept development and before design decisions are made. 
Therefore, the analysis can guide the design, which allows 
improving the safety of the design from the beginning and 
also allows for tracking safety requirements early in the 
design phases to provide architecture and capability for 
design improvements during the lifecycle. STPA also 
considers crew impact and workload much earlier in the 
design process to insure the aircraft design and crew 
procedures properly address crew interaction issues as the 
design evolves.  
Reference 6 describes the analysis of the UH-60MU at 
the aircraft level using FHA as defined in SAE ARP 4761.   
Reference 7 contains a final Safety Assessment Report 
(SAR) for the UH-60MU containing the FHA, a Preliminary 
System Safety Assessment (PSSA), and a System Safety
 Assessment (SSA). The SAR is described as outlining the 
results of “a systematic examination of the design and 
operation of the…aircraft” as well as “a comprehensive 
evaluation of the safety risks being assumed prior to 
Combined Team Testing” (Ref. 7, p. 1). These results are 
compared with the results of STPA on equivalent parts of 
the helicopter. 
One clear difference is that the FHA hazards are limited 
to “failures” and classified according to the criteria shown in 
Figure 9. STPA, in contrast, starts from accidents (losses) 
and prioritizes the accidents (not the hazards) into severity 
levels. Unlike the typical PHA, STPA does not look at all 
hazards (usually defined as failures in an FHA) and spend 
time classifying them. STPA also does not consider 
probability or likelihood. There is not enough information 
about the causes at this point in time to determine their 
likelihood, if that can ever be determined.  In addition, 
assigning probabilities to human decision making and 
software makes no technical sense and can detract from 
investigating the most important safety concerns. The usual 
response to this dilemma using traditional methods is to 
dismiss humans from the analysis process early and to assign 
relative reliability levels to the software and assume these 
reliability levels will be achieved in the software 
development process.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. SAR Hazard severity and probability levels (Ref. 7, pp. 13)
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STPA selects the accidents to be considered based on 
severity only. Those with negligible impact would never be 
considered at all and thus valuable resources would not be 
spent on them. Once the accidents to be considered are 
identified and prioritized, then a decision can be made about 
which ones will be analyzed using STPA and how many 
resources would be expended for each.  Note that the two 
defined accidents for the UH-60MU STPA analysis (A-1: 
Loss of Aircraft; A-2: One or more fatalities or permanent 
disability) fall into the category of critical and catastrophic 
events in Ref. 7 as shown in Figure 9. The causes of only 
these two accidents were included in the STPA analysis. If 
other accidents were important to the stakeholders, they 
could be added to the analysis. 
FHA omits humans from the analysis except for 
assuming that they will mitigate the effects of some failures 
and thus those failures can be classified as having no safety 
effect. Too often, aircraft designs assume the Flight Crew 
will behave perfectly and then blame accidents on imperfect 
Flight Crew behavior. STPA, in contrast, includes Flight 
Crew errors in the hazard analysis and uses the information 
obtained to design the aircraft to reduce those errors. 
Furthermore, the hazards (failures) identified using 
traditional techniques can be incomplete. In contrast, the 
generation of unsafe control actions in STPA follows a 
rigorous process and, if automated, can be shown to be 
complete.  
In addition, the UH-60MU SAR does not distinguish 
between the system-level hazards and the causes of those 
hazards at the component level, as does STPA. Thus, the 
hazards in the SAR include what STPA categorizes as 
hazards, unsafe control actions, and causal scenarios (the 
latter two being identified through the STPA process). 
Comparing the catastrophic, critical, and marginal hazards 
(failures) noted in the SAR with the STPA results, the STPA 
analysis identified all that were associated with the electrical 
and FCS subsystems in the unsafe control actions or in the 
causal scenarios that could lead to the unsafe control actions. 
The STPA process traces these control actions or causes to 
the specific system-level hazard and thus accident so no 
information is lost by this hierarchical decomposition, but 
rather the information is organized in a fashion that allows 
omissions to be identified. In addition, STPA found many 
more “hazards” and causes related to the electrical and FCS 
subsystems, than were identified in the SAR. 
Another important comparison is in the classification 
level of the hazards. Consider the hazards identified as 
marginal in Ref. 6. These hazards include: Loss of a single 
engine, Engine surges during hover taxi, loss of altitude 
indication in a degraded visual environment, loss of heading 
indication in a degraded visual environment, loss of 
airspeed indication in a degraded visual environment, loss 
of aircraft health information, loss of external 
communications, loss of internal communication, and stored 
cargo becoming free during all phases of flight (pp. 65-66).  
One of these hazards classified as marginal is loss of 
communication. Under most conditions, this classification 
may be correct, however there may be conditions under 
which such failures may be more critical. Consider the 1994 
loss of a Blackhawk and the lives of all on board due to 
friendly fire. The investigation report (Ref. 8) cited loss of 
communication as an important cause of this accident. In 
this case, the classification as marginal was incorrect. 
In addition, combinations of these supposedly marginal 
failures could lead to serious accidents. For example, 
consider a situation where there is a degraded visual 
environment as well as a loss of altitude indication, heading 
indication, airspeed indication, aircraft health indication, 
and/or internal communication. Individually, each loss may 
or may not result in an accident. When multiple losses occur 
simultaneously, however, the potential for an accident can 
be raised significantly. Combinations of failures leading to 
hazards (and thus accidents) are identified by STPA. A 
specific example is related to the unsafe control action 
(UCA): The Flight Crew does not provide collective control 
input necessary for level flight, resulting in controlled flight 
into terrain. [H1]. This UCA could occur if the Flight Crew 
believes that they are providing sufficient control input to 
maintain level flight but they are in fact heading in an unsafe 
trajectory. The Flight Crew could have this flawed process 
model because: 
a) The altitude indicator and attitude indicator are 
malfunctioning during IFR flight and the pilots are 
unable to maintain level flight. 
b) The Flight Crew believes the aircraft is trimmed in level 
flight when it is not.  
c) The Flight Crew has excessive workload due to other 
tasks and cannot control the aircraft.  
d) The Flight Crew has degraded visual conditions and 
cannot perceive slow rates of descent that result in a 
continuous descent. 
e) The Flight Crew does not perceive rising terrain and 
trims the aircraft for level flight that results in 
controlled flight into terrain. 
 
In this scenario, loss of feedback to the Flight Crew is 
critical and could contribute to a catastrophic hazard 
(accident). But the SAR classifies the loss of pertinent 
information to the Flight Crew as marginal due to the 
probability of occurrence and the severity level of each of 
the individual failures. STPA, in contrast, identifies this loss 
of feedback as a more significant hazard due to the complex 
interaction of system components and the utmost importance 
of controllers (the Flight Crew) having an accurate process 
model during flight operations.  
 
The UH-60MU SAR identifies residual hazards and 
single point failures that can lead to identified hazards. 
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These are important to analyze further in comparison to the 
STPA results to understand the difference between the two 
methods. Ref. 6 discusses a number of single point hardware 
failures that can lead to the Flight Crew being unable to 
control the aircraft (pp. 80-86), such as piston nuts breaking 
and LVDT rod failures. While it is important to design the 
aircraft to prevent these single point hardware failures, 
STPA goes a step further. Not only does STPA identify 
hardware failures as a contributing factor that could lead to 
the loss of aircraft control, but the analysis also identifies 
software functions and non-failures that can lead to a lack of 
aircraft control. 
Consider the following unsafe control action: The Flight 
Crew does not deflect pedals sufficiently to counter torque 
from the main rotor, resulting in the Flight Crew losing 
control of the aircraft and coming into contact with an 
obstacle in the environment or the terrain [H-1, H-2]. One 
of the causal scenarios that could lead to this unsafe control 
action could be that the Flight Crew is unaware that the 
pedals have not been deflected sufficiently to counter the 
torque from the main rotor. The Flight Crew could have this 
flawed process model because:  
a) The flight instruments are malfunctioning and providing 
incorrect or insufficient feedback to the crew about the 
aircraft state during degraded visual conditions. 
b) The flight instruments are operating as intended, but 
providing insufficient feedback to the crew to apply the 
proper pedal inputs to control heading of the aircraft to 
avoid obstacles during degraded visual conditions. 
c) The Flight Crew has an incorrect mental model of how 
the FCS will execute their control inputs to control the 
aircraft and how the engine will respond to the 
environmental conditions.  
d) The Flight Crew is confused about the current mode of 
the aircraft automation (in general called mode 
confusion) and is unaware of the actual control laws 
that are governing the aircraft at this time.  
e) There is incorrect or insufficient control feedback. 
 
Although failures and malfunctions are considered as 
causal factors for this unsafe control action, the mental 
(process) model of Flight Crewmembers is also considered 
and has equivalent importance to that of hardware or 
component failures. The Flight Crew must receive, process, 
and act upon numerous sources of feedback in order to 
interact with the various vehicle and mission systems 
required for safe operation of the helicopter. The interaction 
of control mode displays, pedal position, reference settings 
for various modes, and other visual and proprioceptive 
feedback can lead to Flight Crew mode confusion, resulting 
in an unsafe control action, especially if external visual 
feedback is degraded. By considering not only the feedback 
that is presented but also how the feedback is presented and 
how this flow of information fits into the larger system 
perspective, safety requirements can be generated that not 
only dictate structural integrity of hardware components, but 
also system and software design that considers the human in 
the loop and the role that the Flight Crew plays during 
operations.  
 
Another example identified in Ref. 6 as a residual 
hazard is APU chaffing that can result in the helicopter’s 
APU not starting (p. 67). This is important because the APU 
is used when the loss of one generator occurs during blade 
deice operations. This residual hazard is considered open in 
the SAR and no recommendations for mitigation are 
provided. 
While APU chaffing can prevent the blade deice 
function from operating, there is another scenario found 
using STPA that could prevent the blade deice function 
when the APU has not failed. Consider the following unsafe 
control action: The Flight Crew does not switch the APU 
generator power ON when either GEN 1 or GEN 2 are not 
supplying power to the helicopter and the blade deice system 
is required to prevent icing. [H-2] One causal scenario that 
could lead to this unsafe control action is that the Flight 
Crew does not know that APU generator power is needed to 
run the Blade Deice System and prevent icing. The Flight 
Crew could have this incorrect process model because:  
a) The ICE DETECTED, MR DEICE FAULT/FAIL, or TR 
DEICE FAIL cautions are not given to the Flight Crew 
when insufficient power is available for the Blade Deice 
System.  
b) The Flight Crew does not know that two generators are 
not providing power to the Blade Deice System.  
c) The Flight Crew acknowledged the GEN1 or GEN 2 
Fail cautions prior to needing the Blade Deice system 
but did not start the APU GEN when the additional 
power was required for the Blade Deice System. 
As this causal scenario highlights, there are additional 
factors besides APU chaffing that could hinder the Blade 
Deice System from functioning, however, only APU 
chaffing is documented and referenced in the UH-60MU 
SAR. In contrast, STPA identifies and documents  
non-failure factors that could contribute to this hazardous 
system state.  The identification of these additional safety 
conditions allows the software designers to place more 
criticality on the hardware and software that is required to 
generate and display these specific cautions to the Flight 
Crew. 
Addressing the quality of information available to the 
Flight Crew dramatically expands the specific design 
features to reduce hazards in the WCA environment. 
Because traditional techniques focus on failure and on 
probabilities, the design features considered often involve 
adding redundancy to reduce the probability of the failure. 
However, redundancy is not always the best solution and can 
be very expensive. In general, the UH-60MU FHA (Ref. 6), 
from which the functional safety requirements were derived 
for the platform, describe the effect of the failure condition 
on the aircraft/crew as “describing the effects of the 
subsystem failure conditions identified as they relate to the 
crew, aircraft, sub-system, environment, property or 
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personnel…and includes various physiological and 
mechanical effects based upon the operational mission” (pp. 
16). STPA requirements include failure modes and the 
interaction of the crew to those scenarios, but also include 
requirements associated with normal functions that could 
cause unsafe control actions.  By including crew interaction 
in the early definition of safety requirements, the safety 
analyst and design team can trace these requirements 
through the design of the subsystems and address complex 
interactions across the various subsystems to ensure safe 
operation under both normal and failure conditions.  These 
human factor requirements do not need to wait for crew 
station evaluations and the development of simulators to 
identify crew interaction problems.   
 
Only a few comparative examples have been discussed, 
however there are many more similar examples that 
highlight the distinction between STPA and the hazard 
analysis techniques used in the UH-60MU Safety 
Assessment Report. Due to differing levels of focus between 
the traditional hazard analyses and this STPA analysis, a  
one-to-one comparison of all results is not possible. In 
general, however, traditional hazard analysis methods focus 
on failure modes and reducing the probability of hazard 
occurrences to levels lower than probabilistic design 
requirements. In contrast, STPA focuses on identifying 
necessary safety constraints (requirements) on the system 
and component behavior and ensuring that system 
controllers have adequate information and feedback to 
operate the aircraft safely.  
MIL-STD-882E Compliance 
STPA was designed to be compliant with  
MIL-STD-882 (all versions) and has been approved 
previously for use in a defense system safety program plan. 
STPA provides support for the process described in the 
standard if no specific tasks are mandated and it also 
supports many of the important tasks that can be required. 
Figure 10 shows the general process required if no specific 
tasks are called out in the contract. STPA directly or 
indirectly assists in meeting the requirements of all eight 
elements. 
In terms of documenting the system safety approach 
(Element 1), STPA not only looks at the technical product 
(the aircraft or weapon) but also can include an overall 
organizational analysis of the system within which the 
product fits. That is, it can be used to “describe how the 
program is integrating risk management into the…Integrated 
Product and Process Development process and the overall 
program management structure” (Ref. 9, p. 10) and also 
analyze this program for its adequacy. 
By using a systematic approach to identifying and 
documenting hazards and risk mitigation measures, STPA is 
also able to directly meet the requirements for Element 2 and 
Element 4. While traditional safety analyses address the 
contribution of failures to creating hazardous states, STPA 
supports both the identification of failures and non-failures 
(e.g., system design flaws) as well as addressing the human 
behavior in response to both failure modes and normal 
function that can lead to hazardous states.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. MIL-STD-882E System Safety Process  
(Ref. 9, p.9) 
While STPA allows the analyst to assess and document 
risk (Element 3), the process purposely does not include 
assigning severity levels or probabilities of occurrence and 
therefore only indirectly supports Element 3. However, 
because STPA is an iterative, top-down hazard analysis that 
generates traceable results and that can be performed at any 
stage in the system’s development lifecycle, the results that 
are obtained using this method contribute to programs 
reducing system risk (Element 5); verifying, validating, and 
documenting risk reduction (Element 6); and managing the 
system life-cycle risk (Element 8). In addition to the eight 
element process, MIL-STD-882E contains various tasks that 
must be completed if assigned to a program. Below are a 
few examples of how STPA can support these various tasks.  
STPA clearly supports Task Section 100 (System Safety 
Management).  While the management tasks described in 
this section are focused on traditional hazard analysis 
techniques, STPA can be integrated and complement these 
management approaches if not replace them all together.  
STPA has the added benefit of addressing safety issues 
associated with the interaction of human operators that can 
and should be traced to design requirements that mitigate the 
unsafe control actions throughout the design, including those 
that are not caused by component failures.   
For instance, Task 106 (Hazard Tracking System) is 
supported by STPA through creating failure mode and 
normal operations mitigation measures that are “identified 
and selected with traceability to version specific hardware 
designs or software releases” (Ref. 9, p. 38).   The inclusion 
of these safety requirements early in the design further 
supports programmatic monitoring of risk throughout the 
lifecycle. 
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STPA also clearly supports the various analysis 
elements called out in Task Section 200 (Analysis).  As an 
example, Task 205 (System Hazard Analysis) states: 
Perform and document a System Hazard Analysis 
(SHA) to verify system compliance with requirements 
to eliminate hazards or reduce the associated risks; to 
identify previously unidentified hazards associated with 
the subsystem interfaces and faults; identify hazards 
associated with the integrated system design, including 
software and subsystem interfaces; and to recommend 
actions necessary to eliminate identified hazards or 
mitigate their associated risks. (Ref. 9, pp. 54) 
In fact, STPA is the only existing hazard analysis technique 
that does satisfy all the specified requirements for a System 
Hazard Analysis including identifying hazards associated 
with integrated system design and not just component 
failures.  
CONCLUSIONS 
1. The demonstration of STPA on the UH-60MU WCA 
system showed it to be a viable and useful hazard 
analysis process that identified all of the hazardous 
conditions related to the electrical system and FCS 
documented in traditional safety assessment reports. 
Furthermore, STPA identified additional hazard causes 
that were not documented by previous traditional 
analyses. As such, STPA can be relied upon in the 
future to increase helicopter safety and strengthen the 
hazard analysis process for Army aviation.  
2. The WCA system is intended to aid the Flight Crew in 
responding to failure and emergency situations. As 
such, even if this system operates properly and as 
intended with no component failures, there can still be 
design flaws that lead to hazardous system states. Such 
flaws are manifested when intended and correct 
feedback is presented to the Flight Crew through WCA 
mechanisms but that feedback does not have the desired 
result of aiding the Flight Crew in preventing an 
accident.  An example is the masking of a caution due to 
priority ranking and the manner in which two cautions 
are presented to the Flight Crew during operations. 
These nuances are not incorporated into traditional 
hazard analysis techniques, but are a focus of STPA. 
3. STPA’s top down approach assists in scoping and 
reducing the analysis effort. Given the very large 
number of system interactions in the UH-60MU and the 
fact that the WCA system is directly or indirectly 
connected with every other system component and 
responsible for presenting critical safety information 
and feedback to the helicopter’s Flight Crew, analyzing 
every possible failure is impossible. By using the 
hierarchical abstraction inherent in STPA, i.e., starting 
with the few system hazards and then analyzing them by 
identifying unsafe control actions (component hazards 
leading to the system hazards) and their causal 
scenarios, the analysis effort is limited to the most 
serious hazards and does not require considering all 
component failures. By first modeling the functional 
control structure and addressing the control and 
feedback mechanisms between the Flight Crew and the 
various subsystems, the safety analyst can better create 
and refine system and component safety requirements 
that may involve complex system interactions early in 
the design process. They can then be traced throughout 
hardware and software development, with mitigations 
included as a function of design and not by adding 
costly redundancy or relying on human procedures to 
mitigate hazards when design changes become 
unaffordable late in the program.  
4. While STPA can be used at any life cycle stage, 
including after the design is complete, as shown in the 
UH-60MU WCA analysis in this paper, it provides the 
most benefits by applying it early in the design effort 
and using the results to guide design decisions and 
design safety into the aircraft from the beginning. STPA 
also is a deliberate and effective approach for 
communicating safety requirements in the early stages 
of design and contracting.   
5. The description of the organizational control structures 
shown in Figures 2 and 3 and the aircraft functional 
control structure shown in Figure 4 represent generic 
control structures that can be used for most military 
helicopters. As such, a generic STPA analysis of unsafe 
control actions can be conducted and driven into system 
specifications and contracting language to set the 
conditions for further analysis at the system level.  By 
including an aircraft level STPA on a functional control 
structure similar to Figure 4 or 5 as part of the 
documentation provided by the government to the 
contractor, the government can drive the safety process 
from the beginning of design and set expectations for 
the traceability of specific hazardous conditions 
throughout the design process, including those that 
involve complex subsystem and human interaction.   
6. Identification of system safety requirements using 
STPA supports both MIL-STD-882E and SAE ARP 
5754A standards for military and commercial aircraft, 
respectively. 
7. STPA is compliant with the requirements for system 
hazard analysis as set forth by MIL-STD-882E and the 
SAE ARP 4754A standard used for commercial aircraft. 
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